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 1 Introduction 
Special interest groups play an extremely important role in the democratic process. They 
complement the electoral process by providing a means through which citizens and interested 
parties can communicate with elected officials and influence policy with more frequency and 
specificity. An abundance of research has examined the benefits and drawbacks of special 
interest group participation in the political process. Most of the previous literature can be divided 
into two distinct categories. One primary line of research centers on the collective action 
problem concerning the configuration of special interest groups while the other examines the 
operations and influence of special interest groups (Gray and Lowery, 1996).  
 As first noted by Olson (1965), special interest groups may be difficult to mobilize as the 
benefits of interest group activity often benefits members as well as non-members. Once a 
special interest group successfully overcomes the mobilization costs and organizes, it is likely 
that the special interest group will stay active. Additionally, Olson (1982) suggests that the 
number of special interest groups rises as time passes as long as the economic and political 
environments remain relatively stable over time. The second primary category of research 
concerning special interest groups provides an extensive analysis of the incentives facing special 
interest groups and politicians (Malbin, 1984; Mueller and Murrell, 1986; Hall and Wayman, 
1990; Mitchell and Munger, 1991). If a special interest group can provide resources such as 
campaign funds and votes, politicians are willing to consider policies and offer resources that are 
beneficial to special interest groups. Therefore, special interest groups are likely to be attracted to 
states with a greater availability of resources.  
 While these studies offer a great deal of insight into the formation and function of special 
interest groups, it is important to examine the causes of growth and change of special interest 
group populations in order to understand the behavior and policy influence of special interest 
 groups. Gray and Lowery (1996) develop a population ecology approach to estimate state special 
interest group populations in the U.S. in order to address this issue. Their study uses a unique 
data set consisting of the number of special interest groups by state in different time periods. 
Using this model, the authors identify the total economic activity within a state, the amount of 
total state government expenditures, and the overall stability of the political environment as the 
primary factors that impact the formation and sustainability of state special interest groups over 
time. Additionally, a subsequent analysis by Boehmke (2002) finds that the availability of the 
voter initiative process provides an additional avenue of influence and tends to increase the 
number of state special interest groups.  
Previous studies, however, have excluded spatial relationships between states as a 
possible explanatory factor in the formation of interest groups. Once a special interest group 
successfully mobilizes and attains some success in one state, the group could seek to expand in 
other states that share similar characteristics. Additionally, individuals in these states could view 
the success of the special interest group and attempt to replicate their accomplishment. For 
example, consider a special interest group that overcomes mobilization costs and successfully 
forms in Florida. Since Florida shares a border with Georgia, the special interest group may face 
lower mobilization costs in that neighboring state. It is also possible that a special interest group 
may choose to mobilize in other states that have share similar economic characteristics rather 
than simply a geographic border. For example, once a special interest group in Florida forms, 
individuals in a state with a similar gross state product (such as Illinois) may be more likely to 
attempt to form a similar special interest group and attempt to achieve the success that the special 
interest group in Florida has attained.  
  A great deal of research in the social sciences has focused on spatial relationships in 
recent years. The exclusion of a significant spatial relationship in regression analysis can lead to 
biased estimates. The primary motivation behind these studies involves the common observation 
that close units tend to exhibit more similar traits than distant units (Huckfeldt, 1986, Vasquez, 
1995, Berry and Berry, 1990). Darmofal (2006) notes that political science data are particularly 
prone to display spatial relationships as they involve the measurement of variables that occur at a 
specific location. When spatial autocorrelation is present, neighboring observations tend to 
exhibit similar traits. It is important to note that this spatial relationship may be caused by 
physical proximity to other observations or by other characteristics that are similar between 
observations. 
The consideration of spatial relationships seems particularly important when examining 
the formation and continuation of special interest groups over time. This study examines several 
possible spatially dependent relationships between states in the U.S. The traditional definition of 
spatial dependence involves examining the geographic location of observations. In addition to 
geography, this paper also examines spatial relationships with gross state product, state general 
expenditures, and the number of union members in the state as additional spatially dependent 
relationships. The findings in this study suggest that some spatial relationships are, in fact, 
important explanatory factors in the formation of interest groups in states over time. This is the 
first paper to explicitly consider the impact of spatial relationships on special interest groups. 
 
2 Data 
This paper employs data from 1990, 1997, 1998, and 1999 for states in the U.S. Sources and 
brief explanations for all data can be found in the appendix. In order to explore the factors that 
influence interest group populations, this study examines the number of registered interest group 
 organizations by U.S. state. The data for the dependent variable were constructed by Gray and 
Lowery (1996). This data set allows for an examination of the growth and change of special 
interest group populations over time. Descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in table 
1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Following Gray and Lowery’s (1996) study of the population ecology of interest 
organizations, we include several independent variables that help to explain special interest 
group populations. Gross state product and gross state product squared are included as an 
indicator of total state economic activity. Gray and Lowery (1996) suggest that special interest 
groups vary according to total state economic activity. Boehmke (2002) finds that states with 
higher gross state product have more active special interest groups, although the marginal effect 
on special interest groups declines as GSP increases. Additionally, state general expenditures as 
a percentage of GSP is included as a measure of the proportion of the economic activity 
controlled by the government that is potentially available to special interest organizations. A 
number of studies suggest that a higher proportion of government expenditures may attract 
additional groups as politicians have more resources for special interest groups to acquire 
(Mueller and Murrel, 1986; Mitchell and Munger, 1991). 
Several political variables are included to account for the political landscape of individual 
states. Olson (1982) and Gray and Lowery (1996) predict that the number of special interest 
groups are more likely to grow as the political climate is stable over time. Divided branch 
government is included by incorporating a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
governor is the opposite political party of a unified legislature. Another dummy variable is used 
to account for the availability of the voter initiative process in states. States in which the voter 
 initiative process is available receive a value of one while states that lack the voter initiative 
process are the excluded group.1 Boehmke (2002) finds that states in which the voter initiative 
process is available have significantly higher numbers of special interest groups, presumably 
because the voter initiative process affords special interest groups an additional avenue of 
influence over the state legislature.  
Political ideology plays an important role in the outcome of legislation as legislators 
generally respond rationally to constituent ideology (Nelson and Silberberg, 1987; Tollison, 
1988). A measure developed by Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998) is used to 
examine the role of ideology in special interest group populations as state government ideology 
differs across states.2 According to Tollison (1988), there are a number of economic incentives 
that influence the behavior of the state legislature, which may in turn impact special interest 
group activity within a given state. In order to help account for these incentives, an index 
developed by Squire (1992) and expanded by King (2000) is included in order to measure 
legislative professionalism.3  
 In order to assess the impact of institutional quality on the population of special interest 
groups, the state institutional score constructed by Karabegovic and McMahon (2005) is 
included as an independent variable.4 Sobel (2008) finds that states with lower institutional 
scores (i.e. states with weaker institutions) have significantly higher numbers of special interest 
groups. Several other variables are included to account for other important differences between 
states. State population and the state population of citizens over the age of 65 are included as 
larger states and states with a greater number of older citizens may be more likely to have higher 
special interest group activity. The number of individuals that belong to unions is also included 
as union workers may be more likely to be represented by a special interest group. 
  
 
3   Empirical Model 
Until now, the analysis of special interest groups has excluded spatial econometric 
techniques that might establish a possible spatial relationship in the formation of special interest 
groups (Gray and Lowery, 1996; Boehmke, 2002). Previous research tests various models 
attempting to find the factors that determine the number of special interest groups using ordinary 
least squares (OLS). The OLS model enforces the assumptions of no spatial interdependence 
(spatial lag) or spatial correlation (spatial error). Under these assumptions, we have the following 
model to estimate: 
uXBY +=  (1)    
where Y is an nT x 1 dependent variable vector, measuring the number of special interest groups 
in a state. The number of states is n and the number of years is T. The matrix X is an nT x k 
matrix of exogenous variables defined in the previous section.  
The OLS estimates of (1) provide a benchmark for the spatial model that follows and a 
comparison to the standing results from the literature. The next step in our empirical model tests 
whether there is a relevant spatial component, unaccounted for in (1).  
Spatial interdependence enters the empirical model in the conditional mean of each 
state’s reaction function. Edmiston and Turnbull (2007) derive these reaction functions 
uXByWy
ij jtijit ++= ∑ ≠λ  (2)    
where, W, is a spatial weight matrix defining each state’s neighbors. In matrix form, the reaction 
functions are ( )XYfY ji ,= . Allowing for spatial interdependence and correlation in (1) yields 
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where ε  is a vector of innovations assumed to be i.i.d. The known weighting matrix, W, has 
zeros across the diagonals and the row sums are standardized to equal one. The coefficient of 
spatial interdependence, λ, measures the interdependence between the numbers of special 
interest groups among states. Likewise, ρ is the coefficient of spatial correlation, which measures 
the correlation between unobserved or unmeasured characteristics. Rearrange (3) to find: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ,; 111 ερλλ −−− −=−+−= WIuWIuWIXBY  (4)    
which is our estimating equation. 
The interdependence effect, λ, is the primary interest in this paper. If there is a significant 
interdependence effect this would imply that the number of special interest groups in one state is 
dependent upon the number of special interest groups in another state. This reaction by special 
interest groups could be viewed as a group of people observing the success of a formed special 
interest group in one state and then reacting to this success by forming a registered special 
interest group in their own state. Thus, the success by a neighboring states’ special interest group 
might have an effect to increase the number of special interest groups in other states. Which 
state’s special interest groups identify themselves with, or who their neighbors are – is unclear, 
that is the role of the spatial weight matrix.  
Defining states as neighbors in (2) and (3) requires the use of a spatial weighting matrix. 
This weight matrix conveniently allows alternative interpretations in defining which states are 
neighbors. One way to define neighbors is in terms of geographic distance, while another way to 
determine neighbors is whether a state shares a similar economic characteristic.  
This paper tests four alternative weight matrix specifications. The three alternative 
economic measures are gross state product (GSP), general expenditures (Gen Exp), and the 
 amount of union workers in a state (UNION).  The geographical measure of distance is based on 
contiguity, where a state’s neighbors are those that share a physical border. Following the Case, 
Hines, and Rosen (1993)5 method for constructing the weight matrix, the elements of W are 
defined as:  
| − | /1=
 −=
=
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ii
  (5)     
where dmeasure  is the sample period mean.  
The rationale for testing alternative weight matrix specifications lies within the problem 
of defining one’s neighbors, because it might not be perfectly clear how special interest groups in 
one state actually identify their neighbors. The task in determining neighbors is a common issue 
in spatial models, and is an empirical question. We look to theory to help provide rationales for 
why the number of special interest groups in one state might be interdependent with the number 
of special interest groups in another; in this case and many others, theory does not provide a 
strong argument for how this interdependence may occur. If the a priori defined neighbors were 
misspecified, then we would not expect to find the number of special interest groups among 
states interdependent, because the test for interdependence incorrectly assumes which states are 
neighbors of one another. Therefore, testing to determine whether the number of special interest 
groups in one state is interdependent with another state is essentially a joint test of whether these 
neighbors are interdependent and whether the neighbors are correctly specified. Researchers 
cannot test whether the weight matrix specification is the correct specification, and this is why 
we test alternatives.  
The first weight matrix specification we test is geographical contiguity. This is a 
conceptually less challenging specification in identifying neighbors. The contiguity weight 
 matrix specification is a very common measure (Case, Hines, and Rosen, 1993; Boarnet and 
Glazer, 2002; Conway and Rork, 2004; Fletcher and Murray, 2006; Rork and Wagner, 2008; and 
Edmiston and Turnbull, 2007). Under this specification, special interest groups in Florida 
identify themselves with two neighbors, Georgia and Alabama; while special interest groups in 
Georgia identify with four neighbors: Florida, Alabama, Tennessee, and South Carolina.  
The first economic variable that we use for an alternative weight matrix specification is 
gross state product (GSP). Perhaps special interest groups associate themselves with special 
interest groups in other states that have a similar economic base or size of their economy. For 
example, the average GSP for Massachusetts is $217.356 billion and the average GSP for North 
Carolina is $218.679 billion, which makes them close neighbors of one another. However, New 
Hampshire’s average GSP is only $34.9 billion indicating that New Hampshire and 
Massachusetts are not close neighbors under this economic specification. However, special 
interest groups may identify their neighbors in other ways as well. 
Another economic variable that we try is related to the size of the state’s government. We 
use the state government’s general expenditures as a possible way in which special interest 
groups identify their neighbors. In our sample, South Carolina and Kentucky have a very similar 
average size of government; South Carolina’s average general expenditures is $14.812 billion 
while Kentucky’s average general expenditures is $14.799 billion – this implies they are very 
close neighbors. On the other hand, New York and South Dakota are not as New York’s average 
general expenditures is $97.242 billion while South Dakota’s average general expenditures is 
$2.402 billion, suggesting they are not close neighbors.  
Our final alternative weight matrix specification allows for the possibility that special 
interest groups identify their neighbors by the amount of union membership in a state. Perhaps 
 special interest groups identify themselves with other states that have similar labor market 
characteristics. This would imply that states with a similar amount of union membership view 
one another as neighbors. In our sample, Wyoming and South Dakota are close neighbors 
because their average number of union workers is 22,000; as well are Massachusetts and 
Wisconsin with an average number of union workers 463,000 and 465,000, respectively.  
To conclude this section, we emphasize that the main topic of interest in this paper is the 
spatial interdependence effect (λ). Allowing for spatial correlation, (ρ), in the empirical model is 
important, because excluding this parameter, when ρ ≠ 0, leads to invalid test statistics for the 
parameter estimates, including spatial interdependence; thus, spatial correlation is essentially a 
nuisance parameter. The methodology used here employs 2SLS (two-staged least squares) and 
GS2SLS–GMM (generalized two-staged least squares – generalized method of moments) 
estimation. Differences between these models have important consequences for statistical 
inference. If there is no spatial interdependence in the conditional mean or spatial correlation in 
the error structure, OLS is the best linear unbiased estimator. In the case where spatial 
correlation does exist, the OLS estimates will be unbiased but not efficient. The GMM correction 
for the error structure is efficient when there is spatial correlation. If spatial interdependence is 
significant, this implies the OLS estimates from (1) are biased. 
 
4 Results 
Our findings in the ordinary least squares regression are consistent with those found in Gray and 
Lowery, which we performed as a consistency check. The spatial analysis for special interest 
groups is the key contribution of this paper.  Four separate measures of spatial relationships are 
 examined.  Our results find that alternative spatial relationships are in fact important in the 
determination of special interest groups. 
 Our first examination of spatial interdependence involves an examination of contiguity 
among states in the U.S. We find that special interest groups are not influenced by geographic 
neighbors as the coefficient on λ in table 2 is not significant.  Somewhat surprisingly, it seems 
that interest groups do not necessarily look to migrate to their geographic neighboring states. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 However, it does appear that a spatial relationship exists between states with similar gross 
state product. Our results in table 3 show that special interest groups will increase by 2.9 groups 
for every 10 groups that a neighbor has when the spatial relationship is defined by gross state 
product. This implies that special interest groups may look to other states with similar gross state 
product as the state in which they start a new organization.  
[Table 3 about here] 
 The spatial effect is also very strong, again at the 1% confidence level, when using state 
general expenditures to define neighbors. The magnitude of the effect in table 4 is slightly 
smaller at 2.2 groups per 10 groups in the neighboring state, compared to the 2.9 groups with 
GSP; nonetheless, this is another economic spatial relationship that is confirmed to be positive 
and significant, compared to the common geographic measure that was insignificant. This means 
that special interest groups also look to neighboring states with similar state general expenditures 
to form new groups. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 The final measure that we test for a spatial relationship is the number of union workers in 
a state. Table 5 reports the interdependence effect of special interest groups and neighboring 
 states with similar numbers of union workers to be positive and significant at the 1% confidence 
level. The magnitude of the interdependence is close to the previous two tests, a λ of .18 or 1.8 
groups per 10 groups in the neighboring states. The result here indicates that special interest 
groups also look to other states that have similar labor market characteristics, in terms of their 
union membership. Combining this evidence with the other three spatial measures reveals that 
the formation of special interest groups does depend on the success of spatially neighboring 
states, and these neighbors are defined in terms of similar economic characteristics, rather than 
geography. Table 6 reports a summary of the interdependence effects between special interest 
groups and the different measures of neighbors. 
[Table 5 about here] 
After finding significant spatial effects in the GS2SLS-GMM regressions, this leads to 
the conclusion that the original estimates in the OLS regression are biased. Thus the focus of the 
discussion for the independent variables will look at only the GS2SLS-GMM results from tables 
2, 3, 4, and 5.  
[Table 6 about here] 
Our analysis concurs with the results from Boehmke (2002) – indicating that states with 
more economic activity, measured by gross state product, are more likely to have special interest 
groups form and thrive where more economic and political resources available. This effect is 
positive and significant near the 10% level for three of the four spatial models. The evidence is 
inconclusive regarding the marginal effect of GSP, using the variable GSP squared. Interestingly, 
however, the amount of spending as a portion of GSP suggests the opposite. The variable 
GE/GSP is negative and highly significant at 1% across all four spatial models. This means that 
as states increase their proportion of spending – less special interest groups will form.  
  Some have suggested that a stable political environment will foster more special interest 
groups, to test this determinant we use the variable divided government. Our results for this 
effect, however, are insignificant. Another political variable we use is the availability of the voter 
initiative process available at the state level. Our a priori expectation is confirmed by the positive 
and highly significant results above the 1% confidence level for all four spatial models. This 
suggests that the voter initiative process can be a helpful tool for special interest groups, which 
increases the likelihood of a group forming in a state where this is available. The remaining 
political variables we include such as the ideology of a state and the legislative professionalism 
are insignificant in our sample.  
 We include population as a demographic variable, which will control for different sized 
states; this variable is insignificant and does not appear to affect the number of special interest 
groups in a state. On the contrary, the amount of population greater than 65 years of age does 
have an impact on the number of special interest groups. This determinant is positive and highly 
significant above the 1% confidence level across all four spatial models. This may not be 
surprising, as senior citizens are much more engaged in the political landscape and have 
enormous lobbying groups. 
 The final two independent variables we include in the analysis controls for the effects that 
unions and institutions may have on determining the number of special interest groups in a state. 
Our union variable is negative and significant at the 1% confidence level across all four spatial 
models. This seems contrary to our hypothesis that a state with more union membership would 
appear to be better organized and thus more adept to lobbying the government for their own 
special interests – thereby increasing the number of special interest groups in a state. Our 
institution variable is negative and nearly significant at the 5% level for the four spatial models, 
 which has a more intuitive explanation. In fact, our estimates are consistent with Sobel (2008) 
where he also finds that states with lower institutional scores in place have more special interest 
groups. Without having institutions in place to adequately handle the bargaining and lobbying of 
government officials, it seems plausible that special interest groups appear more frequently, 
because it is easier for a special interest group to influence the political process.  
  
5 Conclusion   
Understanding how special interest groups form in the U.S. is an important issue.  This paper 
provides evidence that the literature is missing an important element of the equation in 
determining why special interest groups form where they do. Until now, the spatial aspect of 
special interest group formation has been overlooked. This paper employs a GS2SLS-GMM 
estimation technique to discretely analyze the spatial interdependence of special interest groups. 
The findings are surprising and overwhelmingly robust. The results indicate that geographic 
relationships do not play a significant role in the formation of special interest groups. This means 
that special interest groups in one state do not look to the success of their geographically 
neighboring states. On the other hand, the economic variables defining neighbors do show a 
strong interdependence in special interest group formation. The three alternative specifications of 
neighbors show a consistent positive and significant effect, indicating that special interest groups 
look at the success of one of their economically similar neighbors and then react by forming a 
special interest group in their own state. The magnitude of this reaction by special interest groups 
varies from 18-29% and is highly significant across the specifications.  
 The new model of special interest group formation presented in this paper highlights the 
importance of including spatial analysis. Excluding this aspect can have serious consequences on 
 statistical inference. Understanding how special interest groups form has important implications 
for state governments, since they can now anticipate similar special interest groups forming in 
their own state once a group has obtained success in a economically similar state. This finding is 
particularly important, since special interest groups have clearly demonstrated their ability to 
affect policy outcomes at the state level. In addition, the results presented here provide evidence 
that a successful special interest group in one state can expand by focusing their efforts in states 
that have similar economic characteristics, rather than a geographic border. A line of future 
research that would be interesting and useful to this literature could focus on case studies of 
specific special interest groups, possibly following them from formation over a period of time, 
and observing their natural expansion in multiple states in the U.S. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Min Max
Spec. Interest 712.60 72.00 2,969.00
GSP 196,986.70$         11,480.00$           1,502,796.60$      
GSPSQ $              9.38E+10$              1.32E+08$              2.26E+12
GE/GSP 0.12 0.07 0.18
Divided Gov. 0.59 0 1
Voter Init. 0.45 0 1
Ideology 45.55 2.50 97.92
LP 0.26 0.06 0.09
Pop 5,469.75 454.00 33,145.00
Pop65 693.95 47.00 3,648.00
Union 349.13 19.00 2,624.00
State Inst. 6.71 5.1 8.3
D1997 0.25 0 1
D1998 0.25 0 1
D1999 0.25 0 1
$'s in 1,000's
  
Table 2: Special Interest Groups with Contiguity for Weight Matrix
OLS OLS GS2SLS-GMM GS2SLS-GMM
 Coef. t Coef. t
constant 1423.91 2.92 1440.51 3.12
GSP 1.30E-03 2.82 1.36E-03 3.03
GSPSQ -5.00E-10 -2.54 -5.33E-10 -2.80
GE/GSP -3982.89 -3.04 -4073.32 -3.28
Divided Gov. 55.57 1.62 52.98 1.61
Voter Init. 114.46 3.12 122.53 3.18
Ideology 0.62 0.87 0.60 0.87
LP -135.13 -0.46 -114.92 -0.40
Pop 0.00 -0.16 0.00 -0.11
Pop65 0.52 4.71 0.50 4.71
Union -0.33 -3.16 -0.35 -3.44
State Inst. -112.86 -2.20 -119.98 -2.41
D1997 -17.06 -0.29 -32.16 -0.51
D1998 -11.07 -0.18 -31.16 -0.47
D1999 -9.39 -0.14 -24.92 -0.36
Lambda   0.07 0.62
Rho   0.02  
# of obs 192 192
R Sqr 0.79  
  
  
Table 3: Special Interest Groups with GSP for Weight Matrix
GS2SLS-GMM GS2SLS-GMM
 Coef. t
constant 1108.53 2.22
GSP 1.17E-04 0.16
GSPSQ 1.26E-10 0.36
GE/GSP -3265.73 -2.48
Divided Gov. 52.34 1.49
Voter Init. 127.01 3.40
Ideology 0.70 0.95
LP 123.18 0.40
Pop 0.03 1.40
Pop65 0.36 2.96
Union -0.47 -4.16
State Inst. -100.01 -1.94
D1997 6.00 0.09
D1998 12.08 0.17
D1999 22.87 0.31
Lambda 0.29 2.40
Rho 0.06  
# of obs 192
  
 
  
Table 4: Special Interest Groups with Gen Exp for Weight Matrix
GS2SLS-GMM GS2SLS-GMM
 Coef. t
constant 1318.22 2.86
GSP 7.51E-04 1.61
GSPSQ 1.49E-11 0.06
GE/GSP -3917.25 -3.19
Divided Gov. 57.68 1.75
Voter Init. 107.34 3.05
Ideology 0.72 1.04
LP -148.62 -0.53
Pop -0.01 -0.32
Pop65 0.49 4.63
Union -0.29 -2.80
State Inst. -107.51 -2.21
D1997 -8.81 -0.16
D1998 -8.84 -0.15
D1999 -4.95 -0.08
Lambda 0.22 3.34
Rho -0.01  
# of obs 192
    
Table 5: Special Interest Groups with Union for Weight Matrix
GS2SLS-GMM GS2SLS-GMM
 Coef. t
constant 1205.96 2.64
GSP 9.94E-04 2.32
GSPSQ -2.01E-10 -1.00
GE/GSP -3410.15 -2.79
Divided Gov. 41.12 1.27
Voter Init. 102.31 2.93
Ideology 0.26 0.38
LP -33.40 -0.12
Pop -0.01 -0.46
Pop65 0.54 5.26
Union -0.34 -3.40
State Inst. -98.11 -2.05
D1997 -24.47 -0.46
D1998 -22.99 -0.42
D1999 -21.87 -0.38
Lambda 0.18 3.56
Rho -0.07  
# of obs 192
  
 
 
 
  
Contiguity GSP Exp Union
Number of 
Registered 
Interest 
Organizations
0.07 (0.62) 0.29 (2.40) 0.22 (3.34) 0.18 (3.56)
Table 6: Summary table of spatial effects
 Appendix 
 
Data sources and variable definitions. 
 
Variable Definition Source 
NRIO Number of registered interest organizations A 
GSP Gross State Product B 
GSPSQ Gross State Product Squared B 
GE/GSP General Government Expenditures/Gross State Product B 
DivideG = 1 if control of state legislative chambers is split by parties C 
Voterl = 1 if the voter initiative process is available in the state D 
Ideology = 0 – 100; higher scores indicating a more liberal government. E 
LP = 0 – 1, higher scores indicate a more professional legislature F 
POP State population B 
POP65 State population over 65 B 
Union State union membership (number of individuals) B 
State Inst. = 1-10, with institutional quality increasing as the score rises G 
Sources: 
   A: Gray and Lowery (1996)    B: Statistical Abstract of the U.S., U.S. Census Bureau 
   C: U.S. Census Bureau    D: Initiative and Referendum Institute 
   E: Berry et al. (2009)    F: King (2000) 
  G: Karabegovic and McMahon (2005) 
  
 This section is not for publication, but for a referee’s reference.  
3a   Empirical Model 
To allow for spatial interdependence and correlation in the conditional mean of (4) we 
substitute for u , where the structural model for Y, assuming first–order processes is now: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 111 −−− −−+−= WIWIWIXBY λρελ .                                                                 (i)    
The expected value and variance of Y is 
( ) 1),( −−= WIXBWXYE λ                                                                                        (ii)    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ]''[ 11112 −−−− −−−−= WIWIWIWIYVar λρρλσ ε .                                           (iii)    
From (3), it is clear that the number of special interest groups in other states, Yj, is 
endogenous in the model. This is purged using a set of instrumental variables, suggested by 
Kelejian and Prucha (1998), which approximate the ideal instruments. Since, the dependent 
variable is a function of the exogenous variables and the beta coefficients are nonzero, 
multiplying X and X2 (X2 is a subset of X) by the weight matrix creates transformations of the X’s 
to identify the endogenous spending (Yj) on the right–hand side (RHS). These instruments are 
valid as long as one of the beta coefficients on the X’s are nonzero. They are the p linearly 
independent columns of H = (X, WX, WX2) and H overidentifies endogenenous states’ spending 
(Yj).  
The 2SLS estimation only considers the endogeneity of Yj on the RHS of (3) and the 
standard errors calculated here assume that ρ = 0 (no spatial correlation), meaning
.0]'[ =≠∀ jijiuuE  If ρ ≠ 0, the 2SLS estimates are consistent but inefficient because 
jijiuuE ≠∀]'[ = Ω, where Ω is not diagonal:  
( ) ( ) ]'[ 112 −− −−=Ω WIWI ρρσ ε .                                                                               (iv)    
 If there is spatial correlation in (3), we need a consistent estimate of the unknown spatial 
correlation parameter (
∧
ρ ) and the variance–covariance matrix (
∧
2
εσ ) from (iv).  Inconsistent 
estimates of the variance–covariance matrix can yield invalid test statistics for the B parameters 
and the spatial interdependence parameter λ. Kelejian and Prucha (1998) suggest a generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator to find a consistent estimate of 
∧
ρ and 
∧
2
εσ . This method 
allows for a general error structure assuming only that ε is i.i.d. The GMM estimator is based on 
the moment condition E(H’u) = 0 and the p sample moments that are averaged over n and T; 
algebraically this is nTuH titiTtni /'11∑∑ == .  
Kelejian and Prucha (1998) suggest estimating the parameters of interest, B and λ, using a 
three–step procedure. The first step estimates (3) by 2SLS. In the second step, obtain the 
residuals and estimate the unknown spatial correlation parameter ρ and variance–covariance 
matrix 2εσ  using GMM. The third step, re-estimates (3) by 2SLS, after a GLS type 
transformation that utilizes the consistent and efficient variance–covariance matrix 
∧
2
εσ  that 
allows for spatial correlation. Therefore, the GS2SLS–GMM estimator used here is 
∧∧∧
−
∧∧∧∧∧
= )(*')(*])(*')(*[ 1 ρρρρδ YZZZ ,                                                                         (v)     
where 
)()(*),()(*
,')'(,)(*)(*,),(,' 1
WYYYWZZZ
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                        (vi)    
 and 
∧
ρ  is a consistent estimator for ρ obtained by GMM. Unfortunately, Kelejian and Prucha 
(1998) do not provide an analytic expression for the variance–covariance matrix of ρ . With this 
unknown, it is not possible to provide a test statistic for ρ 6.  
Typically, researchers assume that the error process in spatial models follows a Cliff and 
Ord (1981) type first–order process and estimate (i). McGarvey, Walker, and Turnbull (2007), 
however, remain agnostic about the error structure and allow an even more general error process 
to occur. This paper is somewhat more restrictive, as it assumes a first-order error process.  
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 Endnotes 
                                               
1
 Wyoming is not included as a voter initiative state because it has an extremely high signature requirement at 15%. 
Illinois is not included as a voter initiative state because it is the only state in which a proposal can only be used to 
alter the organization of the state legislature. This follows the logic of Matsusaka (2004). The exclusion of Wyoming 
and Illinois does not significantly alter the results. 
 
2
 Berry et al. (1998) construct an index of state government ideology by examining the division of the state 
legislature, the party of the governor, the outcomes of congressional elections, roll call for the state congress, and 
other assumptions about state politicians. This analysis uses the revised 1960-2006 citizen ideology series. It is 
available through the web site listed in the references. The index ranges from 0 – 100, with higher scores indicating 
a more liberal government. 
 
3
 Squire (1992) constructs a state index of legislative professionalism based on the length of the legislative session, 
the salary of legislators, and the staff size. King (2000) updates the index to account for other legislative 
expenditures. 
 
4
 Karabegovic and McMahon (2005) compose an index that rates states on a scale from one to ten regarding 
institutional quality. Institutional quality increases as score rises. The index is based on the size of government, 
discriminatory taxation and government takings, and labor market freedom. 
 
5
 Their preferred model specification uses percent black as an economic distance measure.  
 
6
 The standard errors can be calculated by performing a Monte Carlo simulation or using a bootstrap method, but 
that is not performed here. Obtaining the standard errors to determine the level of significance on the spatial error 
parameter is not essential, as it is a nuisance parameter. However, it is important that the analysis allows for possible 
spatial correlation so that the spatial interdependence estimates remain valid. 
